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The Presidency of the Council of the European Union is held on a rotational basis by EU member states for
six month terms. Andreas Warntjen writes that the frequent change of the Presidency sometimes
causes disruption in EU legislative decision-making. He notes that during the negotiation of the
Lisbon Treaty the principle of increasing the term from six months up to a year was rejected in
favour of creating a permanent President of the European Council, which is held by an individual for
terms of two and a half years. Despite this change, however, the limited role of the European
Council in legislative negotiations has ensured that continuity in Council decision-making still
presents a challenge.
The European Union needs to respond in an efficient and timely manner to the challenges of a complex and fast-
changing world if it wants to effectively further the welfare of its citizens. This requires continuity of legislative
decision-making. Shortcomings in this regard were identified in the discussions leading up to the Lisbon treaty,
which sets out the rules for decision-making in the EU.
A special focus was placed on the work of both the
Council of the European Union (often referred to simply
as ‘the Council’), where ministers and civil servants
discuss legislative proposals, and of the European
Council, where the heads of government decide the
broad guidelines of EU policy. A particular concern was
the length of the term of office of the Council presidency,
which chairs and organises the meetings of the Council.
The Convention on the Future of Europe decided to
increase the term of office of the Council presidency
from six months to a minimum of one year to strengthen
the continuity of the Council’s legislative work. Other
suggestions involved a stronger role for the Secretary-
General in steering the Council’s legislative work.
The Lisbon treaty, however, left the six-monthly rotation
in place for the presidency of the Council. Instead,
continuity in the decision-making process of the Council is supposed to be ensured by a longer term presidency of
the European Council, of up to five years, as well as closer coordination between the rotating Council presidencies
in the form of multi-annual programmes. The Lisbon treaty therefore installed a hybrid solution and two separate
presidencies: a longer term presidency for the meetings of the heads of government in the European Council, but a
continuation of the rotation system for the meetings of the ministers discussing EU legislation in the Council.
The rotating Council presidency remains primarily in charge of the deliberative process regarding legislative
proposals, most of which are not discussed in the European Council, but only in the Council of the European Union.
Furthermore, multi-annual programmes have only a limited effect on the actual conduct of individual Council
presidencies. Thus, the reforms of the Lisbon treaty are unlikely to represent a major step in increasing the
continuity of the Council’s legislative work.
The Council is chaired by the member states on a half-yearly system of rotation. Every six months, a new
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government takes over the role of chairing the meetings of the ministers and working groups of civil servants
discussing EU legislation in the Council. However, many discussions on legislative proposals are not resolved during
one presidency term.
The frequent presidency changes can lead to inefficiencies in the legislative process. Due to national sensitivities
and different priorities, the discussions on some proposals are effectively stalled during a specific presidency.
 During the Council presidency of a country, EU affairs receive more coverage from the national press of that
country. A presidency sometimes delays discussions on a legislative proposal that is controversial in its country, to
avoid resolution while they are in the spotlight as the chair of the Council. Governments also often try to use the
presidency to highlight topics that are of particular national importance. Thus, priorities can shift from one presidency
term to the next. An incoming presidency might also approach some topics from a different angle, thereby
introducing discontinuities in the ongoing discussions. For example, the new presidency might pursue a different
strategy in an effort to build a sufficient consensus on a pending proposal.
A change of the presidency can interrupt the legislative process and lead to a less efficient negotiation process:
momentum is lost, information becomes outdated, and compromises fade away. This can lead to a major disruption
in the discussion of some legislative proposals and, at the aggregate level, quite substantial inefficiencies in the
legislative process overall.
The elected, long-term presidency of the European Council does represent a major innovation in the decision-
making process of the European Council. It does not, however, necessarily have a major impact on the process of
legislative decision-making in the Council. The European Council only meets a few times a year and most of its
discussions are devoted to broad issues of foreign policy and the overall development of the EU: for example how to
respond to the Eurozone crisis. Only a small percentage of legislative proposals are discussed by the heads of
government in the European Council. In contrast, the Council, in its various formations of ministerial and working
group meetings, discusses all legislative proposals. The Council also meets more frequently than the European
Council. Thus, the bulk of the legislative deliberations take place in the Council, not in the European Council.
Similarly, the multi-annual programmes are a useful tool for planning successive presidencies. However, the extent
to which they actually guide the conduct of individual presidencies in steering the legislative work of the Council is
debatable. The multi-annual programme can only give broad guidelines, which might be out-of-date by the time a
new presidency term starts. Thus, the rotating Council presidency is primarily in charge of steering legislative
deliberations in the Council.
The hybrid solution of the Lisbon treaty represents a trade-off between the goal of strengthening the continuity of the
EU’s legislative decision-making and the benefits of a rotation system. The latter include the dispersion of influence,
equal opportunity to highlight topics of national importance, and the learning effect of holding the presidency. One
should note, however, that the value of some of these  benefits is diminished in a Union of 28 member states, where
a country only holds the presidency once every 14 years.
An elected, longer term presidency for the Council, possibly consisting of a representative set of several
governments, or a stronger role for the Secretary-General, would probably increase the continuity of the Council’s
legislative work. The benefits of more efficient legislative decision-making in the Council might outweigh the
diminished benefits of a rotation system.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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